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FOREWORD
The establishment and operation of large manned space facilities in earth orbit would consti-
tute a significant step forward in space. Such long duration programs with orbital stay times
of up to ten years would benefit the earth's populace and the scientific community by provid-
ing:
1. A flexible tool for scientific research.
2. A permanent base for earth oriented applications.
3. A foundation for the future exploration of our universe.
Specifically, the NASA objectives include earth surveys and scientific disciplines of astron-
omy, bioscience, chemistry, physics and biomedicine, as well as the development of tech-
nology for space and earth applications.
Operational and design requirements, of large manned space vehicles, differ from those of
the Meroury, Gemini, and Apollo programs. Of particular interest are the radiation sur-
vivability and nuclear safety requirements imposed by nuclear power reactors and isotopes
and the long term interaction with the natural radiation environment.
The General Electric Company under contract to NASA-MSFC (NAS8-26283) has performed
a study entitled "Space Base Nuclear System Safety" for the express purposes of addressing
the nuclear considerations involved in manned earth orbital missions. The study addresses
both operational and general earth populace and ecological nuclear safety aspects. The pri-
mary objective is to identify and evaluate the potential and inherent radiological hazards as-
sociated with such missions and recommend approaches for hazard elimination or reduction
of risk.
Work performed utilized the Phase A Space Base designs developed for NASA by North
American Rockwell and McDonnell Douglas as baseline documentation.
The study was sponsored jointly by NASA's Office of Manned Space Flight, Office of Ad-
vanced Research and Technology, and Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute. It was
performed for NASA's George C. Marshall Space Flight Center under the direction of Mr.
Walter H. Stafford of the Advanced Systems Analysis Office. He was assisted by a joint NASA
and AEC advisory group, chaired by Mr. Herbert Schaefer of NASA's Office of Manned Space
Flight.
The results of the study are presented in seven volumes, the titles of which are listed in
Table A. A cross-reference matrix of the subjects covered in the various volumes is pre-
sented in Table B.
Table A. Manned Space Flight Nuclear System Safety Documentation
Volume
I
Part 1
Part 2
II
Part 1
Part 1A
III
Part 1
Part 2
Part 2 A
Part 3
IV
Part 1
Part 2
V
Parti
Part 2
VI
VII
Part 1
Part 2
Executive Summary
Space Base Nuclear Safety
Space Shuttle Nuclear Safety
Space Base Preliminary Nuclear Safety Analysis
Nuclear Safety Analysis (PSAR)
Appendix-Alternate Reactor Data (CRD)
Reactor System Preliminary Nuclear Safety Analysis
Reference Design Document (RDD)
Accident Model Document (AMD)
Accident Model Document - Appendix
Nuclear Safety Analysis Document (NSAD)
Space Shuttle Nuclear System Transportation
Space Shuttle Nuclear Safety
Terrestrial Nuclear Safety Analysis
Nuclear System Safety Guidelines
Space Base Nuclear Safety
Space Shuttle/Nuclear Payloads Safety
Space Base Nuclear System Safety Plan
Literature Review
Literature Search and Evaluation
ASRDI Forms
Document No.
72SD4201-1-1
72SD4201-1-2
72SD4201-2-1
72SD4201-2-1A
72SD4201-3-1
72SD4201-3-2
72SD4201-3-2A
72SD4201-3-3
72SD4201-4-1
72SD4201-4-2
72SD4201-5-1
72SD4201-5-2
72SD4201-6
72SD4201-7-1
72SD4201-7-2*
*Limited distribution
VI
This study employs the International system of units and where appropriate the equivalent
English units are specified in brackets. A list of Conversion Factors and a Glossary of
Terms is included in the back of each volume.
Table B. Study Area Cross Reference
* [4") PRIMARY DISCUSSION
^") SUMMARY OR SUPPLEMENTAL
DISCUSSION
•Section number is included where
appropriate
STUDY AREAS
SPACE BASE PROGRAM
Reference Vehicle Data
Radiation Limits
Radiation Environment/Hazards
Radiation Effects
Mission Support Nuclear Safety
Orbital Operations Nuclear Safety
Design Si Operational Considerations
Guidelines it Requirements
Reactor System Studies
Terrestrial Safety Analysis
Reference Design
Accident Models & Source Terms
Risk Analysis
System Safety Plans
Technology Development Required
SPACE SHUTTLE PROGRAM
Reference Vehicle Data
Nuclear Payload Integration
Design & Operational Considerations
Guidelines and Requirements
Terrestrial Safety Analysis
LITERATURE REVIEW DATA
Approach and Cross Index
ASRDI Forma
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APPENDIX D
MISSION ABORT SEQUENCE T R E E S
This appendix contains the detailed abort sequence trees for the reference zirconium hydride
(ZrH) reactor power module that have been generated for each phase of the reference Space
Base program mission. These trees are graphical representations of causal sequences.
Each tree begins with the phase identification and the dichotomy between success and failure.
The success branch shows the mission phase objective as being achieved. The failure branch
is subdivided, as conditions require, into various primary initiating abort conditions. From
each of these initiating events, the causal chain is followed through to either (1) a nuclear
hazard, (2) a condition that results in "no discernible hazard", or (3) a successful repair or
correction that leads back to the success branch. In this manner, the sequence trees show
how the particular events and their "relative probabilities" are determined. Terminology
used in the abort sequence trees is defined in the Glossary of Terms.
The abort sequence trees were generated without considering probabilities; all events that
seemed even remotely possible were considered. Only upon completion of the trees were
probabilities considered. The probability of a given accident occurring in any phase of the
mission was derived from experimental data where available, and from engineering judge-
ment where such data was lacking.
The abort sequence trees use five graphical symbols as illustrated on the next page.
D-l
"CUMULATIVE
PROBABILITY
BEGINNING
OF A MISSION
PHASE SEQUENCE
CONTINUE SEQUENCE AT "A"
INTERMEDIATE
EVENT
RELATIVE
PROBABILITY NODISCERNIBLE
HAZARD
TERMINAL
EVENT
CUMULATIVE
PROBABILITY
INTERMEDIAT
EVENT
RELATIVE
PROBABILITY ENT
LEADING
TO NUCLEAR
HAZARD
NUCLEAR
HAZARD
1. The ovi^- used for initiating events and for intermediate and terminal events in which
a nuclear hazard has not occurred.
2. The diamond - used for intermediate and terminal events in which a nuclear hazard
is the direct result or to indicate a nuclear hazard itself (indicated by a large dot
placed next to the diamond).
3. The circle - used for terminal events which result in "no discernible hazard" to the
populace.
4. The triangle - used for indicating where a sequence is to be continued.
5. The pentagon - used for the beginning of a mission phase sequence.
D-2
"Relative probability" is defined as the probability of a particular event to occur given a de-
fined set of choices; cumulative probability (sometimes referred to as "mission probability")
is the overall probability of a sequence of events occurring (product of relative probabilities
of the individual events along the path) during the mission (starting from prelaunch). The
relative probability of a particular event occurring is placed in the lower section of the event
box. If the relative probability of an event is 1. 0, no probability is shown in the event box.
Parallel events in the sequence trees are taken as mutually exclusive. Therefore, the sum of
the relative probabilities of parallel events is one. It is assumed that event probabilities of
-12less than 10 have a negligible effect on risk and, hence, individual branches of the abort
sequence trees are terminated and deemed "Non-credible".
The following list indicates which figures are associated with the particular mission phases:
Mission Phase Figure No. Page No.
1. Prelaunch D-l and D-2 D-5 and D-6
2. Launch/Ascent D-3 to D-10 D-7 thru D-14
3. Orbital Operations D-ll to D-49 D-l5 thru D-53
4. Reactor Disposal ' D-50 to D-127 D-54 thru D-131
D-3/
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CONVERSION FACTORS
INTERNATIONAL TO ENGLISH UNITS
Physical Quantity
Acceleration
Area
Density
Energy
Force
Length
Mass
Power
Pressure
Speed
Temperature
Volume
International
Units
2
m/sec
2
m
Kg/m2
Joule
Newton
m
Kg
watt
2Newton/m
m/sec
K
m3
English Units
2ft/sec
.ft2
in2
lb/ft3
lb/in3
Btu
Ibf
ft
nm
Ibm
Btu/sec
Btu/min
Btu/hr
Atmosphere
lbf/in2
Ibf/ft2
ft/sec (fps)
F
in3
Conversion Factor
Multiply By
. 3.281
10.764
1550.39
6.242 x 10~2
3.610 x 10~5
9.479 x 10"4
2.248 x 10"1
3.281
5.399X 10~4
2.205
9.488X 10"4
5.691 x 10~2
3.413
3.413
1.451X 10"4
2.088xlO~ 2
3.281
(9/5 -459.67/tK)
6.097 x 104
it- 35.335
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Abort
Accident
Airborne Material
Breached
Bulk Damage (Radiation)
Contamination
Control Drum Motion
Core Compaction
Cover Gas
Credible
Criticality
Critical Mass
Cumulative Probability
Damaged
Decontamination
Destructive Excursion
Disassembly/Disassembled
Disposal
Distributed Material
Dose Guidelines
Dosimetry
Premature and abrupt termination of an event or mission because of existing or imminent
degradation or failure of hardware. (In the safety analysis, no distinction is made between
an accident and abort.)
An undesirable unplanned event which may or may not result from a system failure er mal-
function.
Radioactive gases, vapors and particulars released to the air.
Fuel elements, coolant loops, pressure vessel, core, or radiation shield are (a) physically
torn by thermal or mechanical stresses, (b) cut open by fragmentation or (c) split open by
Internal pressures.
Radiation causing atomic displacement in semiconductor devices - sometimes commonly
referred to as "crystal" damage.
A condition where a radioactive material is mixed or adheres to a desirable substance or
where radioactivity has spread to places where it may harm persons, experiments or make
areas unsafe.
Rotation of the control drums or drum toward or away from the most reactive position within
a reactor. (As used in safety analysis results in a reactor excursion.)
The act of increasing the density of the core which results in increased reactivity and possible
criticality.
A gas blanket used to provide an inert atmospheric environment around hardware to minimize
potential reactions which can give rise to accident situations.
12An event having a relative or cumulative probability of occurence of > 10" .
The act of obtaining and sustaining a chain reaction.
The mass of fissionable material necessary to obtain criticality.
Sometimes referred to as "Mission probability" is the overall probability of a sequence of
events occurring (product of "relative probabilities" of the individual events along a path of
an abort sequence tree).
Same as "Breached".
The removal of undesired dispersed radioactive substances from material, personnel, rooms,
equipment, air, etc. (e.g., washing, filtering, chipping).
An excursion (safety analysis assumes ~ 100 MW-sec) accompanied by a complete disassembly
of the reactor, a prompt radiation emission and release of fission product gases, vapors and
particulates.
Nuclear hardware (e.g., reactor) which has been violently broken or separated into parts and
not capable of forming a critical mass.
The planned discarding or recovery of nuclear hardware.
The spread of nuclear fuel and radioactive debris on the earth's surface-following impact or
destructive excursion.
Established radiation levels used in the nuclear safety analysis for evaluating number of
exposures and in determining operating limits and boundaries.
Techniques used in the measurement of radiation.
II
GLOSSARY OF TERMS (CONT)
Dynamic Interference
Early Reactor Disposal
Electrical Power System
End of Mission
Excursion
Exposure Limit
Fission Products
Fuel
Fuel Element/Capsule
Fuel Element Ablation
Fuel Element Burial
Gallery
Ground Deposited Particles
Hazard
Hazard Source
Immediate Reentry
Impact in Deep Ocean
Impact in Reservoir
Impact in Water Containing
Edible Marine Life
Intact Reentry/Reactor
Integrated/Cumulative Dose
Interfacing Vehicle
An experiment radiation effect where the flux rate above some threshold (a fraction of the ex-
periment signal-to-noise ratio at maximum sensitivity, for electronic detectors) causes
noticeable degradation of data quality.
Attempted disposal of the reactor prior to its successful completion of 5 years operational
lifetime.
All components (heat source, regulation, control, power conversion and radiators) necessary
for the development of electrical power. The reactor electrical power system includes all
hardware associated with the Power Module with the exception of the Disposal System.
Generally associated with the termination of the mission or flight. Is also used to define those
activities involved with disposal and recovery of hardware after Intended lifetime.
A rapid and usually unplanned increase in thermal power associated with the operation of a
power reactor.
Total accumulated or time dependent radiation exposure limits imposed on personnel by regula
tory agencies or limits which preclude equipment damage.
The nuclides (quite often radioactive) produced by the fission of a heavy element nuclide such
as U-235 or Pu-239.
Fissionable material in a reactor or radioisotopes in a heat source used in producing energy.
A shaped body of nuclear fuel prepared for use in a reactor or heat source. Common usage
involves some form of encapsulation.
Fuel element clad and/or fuel removed by reentry heating, releasing fission products to the
atmosphere.
Individual fuel elements beneath the ground surface completely covered by soil.
The compartment of the reactor shield which houses the major primary loop components.
Particles deposited on the ground from radioactive fallout.
An existing situation caused by an unsafe act or condition which can result in harm or
damage to personnel and equipment.
The location and/or origin of the hazard.
Very early reentry of the reactor (e.g., misaligned thrust vector which causes firing of the
reactor disposal rockets toward earth resulting in 1-2 day reentry).
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material in the ocean, beyond the Continental Shelf where
contamination of the food chain is extremely remote.
Reentering and/or Impact of nuclear material in reservoir containing potable drinking water.
Reentering and/or impact of nuclear material on the Continental Shelf or In a body of
water such as a lake, river or stream where contamination of the food chain is likely.
A nuclear system that retains its integrity upon impact and in the case of a reactor is capable
of undergoing an excursion.
The total dose resulting from all or repeated exposures to radiation.
Any defined module, spacecraft, booster or logistic vehicle which may have an interaction
with the Manned Space Base.
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lonization Damage
Land Impact
Logs of Coolant
Mission Support
Moderator
NaK-78
No Discernible Hazard
Non -credible
Non-destructive Excursion
Normal Operations
Over Moderation
Permanent Shutdown
Poison
Power Module
Premature Reentry
Pre-poison
Prompt Radiation
Quasi-Steady State
Radiological Consequences
Radiological Hazard* .
Radiological Risk
Random Reentry
Reactivity
Radiation causing surface damage In materials (e.g., the fogging of film).
Nuclear hardware which Impacts land at terminal velocities following reentry and lower velo-
cities during prelaunch or early in the launch/ascent phase.
Loss of organic or liquid metal coolant in reactor coolant loops due to failure/accident.
Supporting functions provided the Space Base Program by ground personnel and interfacing
vehicles throughout all mission phases.
Material used In a nuclear reactor to slow down neutrons from the high energies at which they
are released to increase the probability of neutron capture: Water and hydrogen are modera-
tors in a thermal reactor.
An alloy of sodium (22% by weight) and potassium (78%) used as a liquid metal heat transfer
fluid.
Represents no hazard to the general populace.
An event having a relative or cumulative probability of occurrence of < 10
not worthy of concern.
-12 Considered
A temperature excursion which may rupture the primary coolant loop and release fission pro-
ducts to the environment but - leaves the reactor shield essentially intact.
Planned and anticipated mission activities and events.
Immersion of reactor in an hydrogenous medium (moderator) resulting in increased neutron
reflection into the core causing a reactor excursion.
Enacting provisions which preclude reactor crlticallty under all foreseeable circumstances.
A material that absorbs neutrons and reduces the reactivity of a reactor.
The complete reactor/shield, radiator, power conversion system and disposal system unit as
provided on the Space Base.
Any reentry of the reactor from Earth orbit with orbital lifetimes less than the planned (1167
year) orbital decay time of the 990 km disposal altitude.
A poison which is added to the reactor fuel for purposes of controlling reacticity. Sometimes
referred to as "burnable poison".
The neutron and gamma radiation released coincident with the fission process as opposed to the
radiation from fission product decay. Commonly associated with an excursion event.
A term used to describe the condition when a reactor periodically goes critical and then sub-
critical due to water surging in and out of the core.
The radiation exposure effect on personnel and the ecology from a radiation release accident or
event.
Hazards associated with radiation as differentiated from other sources.
The term used to define the average number of people anticipated to be affected by radiation
in a given mission or phase thereof.
The uncontrolled non-directed reentry of a vehicle from orbit.
A measure of the departure of a reactor from critical such that positive values correspond to
reactors super-critical and negative values to reactors which are sub-critical. (Usually ex-
pressed in multiplesof a dollar.)
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Reactor Falls to Survive Reentry
Reactor Survives Reentry
Reactor/Shield
Relative Probability
Repair/Replacement
Ruptured
Safety
Safety Catastrophic
Safety Critical
Safety Marginal
Safety Negligible
Scram System
System Safety
Space Base Program
Space Debris
Space Shuttle
Source Terms
Tracer
Reactor/shield is completely disassembled by reentry heating, releasing Individual fuel ele-
ments and structural debris to the atmosphere.
Reactor is not disassembled by reentry heating; radiation shield may be damaged.
A system containing the reactor, control drums, gallery and surrounding LiH and Tungsten
shield.
Probability of the occurrence of a particular event given a defined set of choices.
Consists of (a) physically repairing all faulty systems, or (b) complete replacement of the
faulty system(s).
Same as "Breached".
Freedom from chance of injury or loss to personnel, equipment or property.
Conditions) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem or component malfunction will severely degrade system perform-
ance, and cause subsequent system loss, death, or multiple injuries to personnel (SPD-1A).
Conditions) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem or component malfunction will cause equipment damage or per-
sonnel injury, or will result in a hazard requiring immediate corrective action for personnel
or system survival (SPD-1A).
Condltion(s) such that environment, personnel error, design characteristics, procedural
deficiencies, or subsystem failure or component malfunction will degrade system perform-
ance but which can be counteracted or controlled without major damage or any Injury to
personnel (SPD-1A).
Condition(s) such that personnel error, design characteristics, procedural deficiencies, or
subsystem failure or component malfunction will not result in minor system degradation and
will not produce system functional damage or personnel injury (SPD-1A).
A separate, possibly automatic, mechanism used to rapidly shut down a reactor.
The optimum degree of risk management within the constraints of operational effectiveness,
time and cost attained through the application of management and engineering principles
throughout all phases of a program.
All aspects of the Space Base mission including all prime and support hardware and personnel
both on the ground, at sea or In orbit, which are required throughout all mission phases.
Uncontrolled radioactive or non-radioactive man-made objects in space; these objects may
present collision and radiation hazards to earth orbital missions.
The manned vehicle used for the transportation of cargo to and from earth orbit. A sepa-
rately launched vehicle (booster) on which the Shuttle is placed provides the initial first
stage thrust.
Characterization of a radiation hazard with regard to (a) location, (b) magnitude, and
(c) exposure mode.
Material in which Isotopes of an element may be incorporated to make possible observation
of the course of the element through a chemical, biological or physical process. '
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